Best of "Global South" Values still Offer Alternatives in Times of Global Uncertainty

WILLIAM GUMEDE is Associate Professor at the School of Governance, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg; and Course-Leader at the School of Public Policy (SPP), Central European University (CEU), Budapest. He is Executive Chairman of the Democracy Works Foundation. Was previously a Senior Associate and Programme Director of the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. He is the author of *South Africa in BRICS* (Tafelberg 2013).

The South East Asian developmental states used positive aspects of their ancient traditions more effectively to promote sustainable nationhood, inclusive growth and development than their African counterparts. Thus, the "Asian Tigers" more successfully used aspects of their traditional cultures to combat corruption, make company corporate cultures more inclusive and foster common national identity. Confucianism is a humanistic ethical philosophy, with origins nearly 2000 years ago in China, whose influence on social behaviour has remained intact in many Asian societies. It is widely practiced in East Asian Tigers such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore.

Consequently, these societies have used positive aspects of Confucianism to lift millions equitably out of poverty and establish globally competitive companies and peaceful societies over relatively short periods.[1] "Does the way the East Asian Tigers used positive aspects of Confucianism offer an alternative model for development, to tackle corruption and install ethical moral values; to a South Africa and African countries which are in deep-seated poverty, corruption and violence?"

Does it offer us the opportunity to examine positive aspects of traditional African values which could be leveraged similarly to promote caring, equal and honest societies?

Confucian morality and ethics

Confucian approaches are not homogenous. Confucianism is contested, like all traditions, with a range of interpretations of key principles. Nevertheless, there are some core aspects on which there is reasonable agreement.[2]

Confucianism emphasises the right to human equality, worth and dignity.[3] Confucian philosophy argues that individuals, in their relations with others, must engage ethically, morally and fairly. It is expressed in the terms *ren* (benevolence), *li* (propriety)[4] and *shu* (reciprocity)[5]. Morality includes the virtues of benevolence (*ren*), which is sensitivity 'to the needs and feelings of others'[6]; consistently behaving in a principled fashion (*Li*); and 'treating others as one wishes to be treated oneself' (*shu*)[7] .

Combining the virtues of *ren*, *li* and *shu* leads to social harmony.[8] In Confucianism, a state should be concerned about inequality (*bujun*) in wealth between people.[9] But *bujun* goes beyond wealth to include political equality.[10] The Confucianism ideal is for the "virtuous" (*junzi*), the honest, the knowledgeable and the talented to work in government.[11] A person who sets a moral example in behavior is classified as *junzi*.[12]

Harmony is crucial in Confucianism. 'This may include harmony between societies, harmony within a society with different ethnic groups (or political parties), harmony within the same ethnic group with different kin, and harmony among the same kin'.[13]

The Confucius scholar, Chenyang Li, argues that "harmony" does not mean "sameness".[14] Harmony, in fact, 'presupposes differences and has to be achieved through differences'. Li makes an argument for "cooperative opposition", where opposing parties can be brought 'into harmony without harming one another'.[15] Furthermore, to move from tension, strife and opposition to harmony 'requires coordination or cooperation among the involved parties, either consciously or unconsciously'.[16]

> However, the paternalistic aspects of Confucianism, which emphasise loyalty to family, group and clan, could translate into cronyism, corruption and waste; with jobs, contracts and largesse given to members of the favoured group. The partnerships between government, business and trade unions could easily become patronage-based, encouraging cronyism, corruption and pork-barrelling.

Confucianism values consensus over conflict, preferring to accommodate 'different views and seeking compromises for the sake of the common good'.[17] In Japan and South Korea, consensus is strongly emphasised in politics, business and family relations.[18] Consensus between government, business and civil society to pursue growth in the post-Second World War, with each social partner agreeing to compromises, is at the heart of the East Asian Tigers' economic miracles.

Confucianism emphasises education. In South Korea such is the reverence for teachers that they are not called by their names by students, but rather by their function, *seongsaengim*, out of respect for their learning.[19] In 1984, the Singapore government introduced the teaching of Confucian ethics in schools.[20]

Many Southeast Asian scholars argue that Confucianism is compatible with democracy.[21] Japan, the oldest democracy in Asia, is a case in point.[22] In a study on the historical roots of the South Korean democratisation process, Kwon Tai-Hwab and Cho Hein remark that 'in the long run, the Confucian legacy may play an increasingly positive role in the democratisation of Korea'[23] through 'mutual adjustments in the interface between Confucian and Western ideals'[24].

Not all aspects of Confucianism are necessarily good

Confucianism makes a case for reciprocity (*shu*) in social relations and exchanges. Reciprocity in relations precipitates the 'exchanges of mutual benefits or favours'.[25] This practice is called *guanxi*. However, in many cases this practice of *guanxi* has been abused and has resulted in bribery, corruption and pork-barreling.[26]

Among the emphasis of Confucianism is *zhong*, interpreted as loyalty to elders and superiors, and *xiao*, filial piety, which translates into respect towards your elders.[27] In companies such as Toyota in Japan and Samsung in South Korea, employees are regarded as part of a "family".[28] The CEO of the company is seen as the 'the head of the family who appreciate[s] contact with workers (family members), leading to formulations such as the 'Samsung family', the 'Toyota family', the 'Hyundai family' and so on'.[29]

Confucianism also makes it easier for social partners, government, business and civil society to coordinate and create growth coalitions. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan had partnerships between government, business and trade unions in which each one made compromises to raise the productivity of the economy. However, the paternalistic aspects of Confucianism, which emphasise loyalty to family, group and clan, could translate into cronyism, corruption and waste; with jobs, contracts and largesse given to members of the favoured group. The partnerships between government, business and trade unions could easily become patronage-based, encouraging cronyism, corruption and pork-barrelling.

This is not to say that some opportunistic East Asian leaders and governments do not manipulate culture for self-interest, to hide corruption or to suppress critics. In fact, on occasion, it is used to compel uncritical loyalty to the leader and the state.[30] 'The impression that Confucianism advocates the suppression of the self for the sake of societal interests may be due to the politicisation of Confucianism'[31], and the 'attempts by various groups to politicise Confucian ethical values for other non-ethical purposes'.[32]

> This is not to say that some opportunistic East Asian leaders and governments do not manipulate culture for self-interest, to hide corruption or to suppress critics.

Khun-Eng Kuah writes that Confucianism can be an 'important ideological tool for social engineering', by potentially providing 'a set of moral and ethical values that legitimises the perpetuation of a highly centralised and authoritarian system of government'.[33] Tu Wei-Ming warns that often, Confucianism is politicised for reasons of self-interest, when leaders encourage submissiveness, 'passive acceptance of authority' and hierarchical power relationships between the elite and ordinary citizens.[34]

Submitting passively to traditional authority, political leaders or party results in 'self-depreciation without dignity, communal participation no longer means the extension and deepening of one's humanity'.[35]

Autocratic leaders have often abused this to demand loyalty to the leader from citizens.[36] Paternalistic aspects of Confucianism to promote hierarchy, loyalty to leader, elders and group and suppression of the individual will to that of the collective, have on occasion been abused by political leaders and governments to hold whole populations under the leash.[37]

Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, for example, censored the media, made homosexuality a crime and banned chewing gum.[38]

In Taiwan in 1948, the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or "KMT") and its leader Chiang Kai-shek introduced martial law (only suspended in 1987), banning independent trade unions, civil society organisations and the media.[39] The KMT outlawed all opposition parties. It only allowed trade unions, business associations and civil society groups that deferred to the leader and government unquestioningly.

> The Indian Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen has long ago debunked the wrong-headed notion that democracy is Western or foreign to Asian or African cultures, arguing convincingly that democracy is "universal" and that there are both democratic and undemocratic elements in all cultures.

Many South East Asian leaders, like Singapore's former leader Lee Kuan Yew, have often abused aspects of Confucianism that emphasised the collective, to argue that democracy, individual rights and interests are "Western values" and therefore "undesirable" and undermine moral values. Yew said: 'Traditional Asian ideas of morality, duty and society which have sustained and guided us in the past are giving way to a more Westernised, individualistic and self-centred outlook on life'.[40]

Those who, like Yew, argue that Confucianism is intrinsically authoritarian, have been convincingly rebutted. Charlene Tran wrote 'all individuals possess and exercise rights that are intrinsic in and supported by Confucian philosophy'.[41]

The Indian Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen has long ago debunked the wrong-headed notion that democracy is Western or foreign to Asian or African cultures, arguing convincingly that democracy is "universal" and that there are both democratic and undemocratic elements in all cultures.[42]

Indeed, as some argue, Confucianism emphasises the 'right to rebellion if the state does not fulfil its role; whenever a dynasty comes to an end, it has always been justified on the grounds that the state was not performing its functions, whether economic or political'.[43] Furthermore, aspects of Confucianism also encourage the right to criticise 'when there is a violation of propriety and justice'.[44]

South Korea's New Village Movement

South Korea's President Park Chung-Hee, who led the country from 1961 to 1979, launched the "Saemaul Undoing" or New Village Movement on 22 April 1970. The movement used the Confucianism principle of community to encourage local community-led development.[45] Each village was given 335 bags of cement, half a ton of iron rods and a four-step local community development plan.

Every village member had to join the development.[46] The villagers had to select their leaders. Village committees were elected. Decisions were made at traditional village assemblies. The community had to pledge small amounts of money. Communities had to build new homes or upgrade their homes collectively. Communities had to establish cooperative companies producing local products.

Together, the communities built amenities, infrastructure and policing mechanisms. Villages partnered their development efforts with neighbouring communities. The villagers modernised roads, bridges and irrigation systems. Women played crucial roles in the organisation of the reconstruction; which spawned a village women's movement, with organisations such as the Mother's Club raising to prominence. Women's involvement in the New Village Movement countered and changed age-old patriarchal views of women's abilities.[47]

Within a decade, the village movement had decreased poverty significantly. It transformed the dilapidated thatched rural houses called *choga-jip* houses, into new, sturdy tiled housing. The leading role of women in the movement strengthened their power in rural society.[48]

Japanese employee participation in business decision-making

Many Asian Tigers used the principles of Confucianism to argue that the role of business is not solely to pursue profitmaking at all costs; but that it has obligations to its employees, local communities and society. This has manifested in firms putting "doing right" over profit.

The organisational culture of such firms is inclusively managed both internally and externally. Employees are included in decision-making, provided with skills' training and benefits; and customers are not short-changed for short-term profit. Some scholars have dubbed business leaders based on the ethical foundations of Confucianism as "ethnocracy".

Japan's firms make decisions through consensus involving all employees and by spreading the benefits of profit to all employees.[49] Japanese firms have a number of avenues for employee participation.[50] These include quality control circles formed from employees from different units, which meet regularly to make suggestions on increasing the efficiency and quality of products. Their proposals are then passed on to management.

> Japanese companies provide long-term employment, welfare and employee participation in return for labour market peace, increased productivity and employee loyalty to the firm.

Companies have management-labour joint structures to share company information, strategy and direction. Trade unions in Japan are based at the enterprise, rather than the sector type of unions we see in South Africa and other countries. There is a cooperative partnership at the firm level between management and unions – and their interests are often aligned. Japanese companies provide extensive corporate welfare in the form training, housing benefits and community development.

Japanese companies provide long-term employment, welfare and employee participation in return for labour market peace, increased productivity and employee loyalty to the firm.[51] Surveys have shown that, in the long run, there 'is a clear link between ethics and strategic management: honesty, trustworthiness, etc. may increase corporate returns, for example, through signalling effects that allow suppliers, potential employees, and present employees to infer that the firm will not be unethical in its behaviour toward them'.[52]

Singapore building national identity on shared values

Singapore became a standalone independent country in 1965. The country used the communitarian aspects of Confucianism to mould together a common identity for one of the most diverse countries on earth.[53]

Singapore has an ethnically diverse society, with the Chinese community making up 77%, Malays 14%, Indians 7.7% and mixed groups around 1.3% of the population. These different communities are diverse within themselves. Different ethnic groups have different religious beliefs, and within individual ethnic groups, there are also different religious beliefs.

Under colonialism, the different communities lived separately. Before and after colonialism, however, the different ethnic groups have clashed violently. After the Second World War, communities in Malaya 'were mobilised in discrete racial silos, and inter-ethnic bargaining among communal leaders on behalf of their communities was institutionalised as the dominant model of multiracial political rule'.[54]

In 1957, the Singapore People's Action Party (PAP) took power following the end of colonialism. The PAP argued for the forging of a new national identity, based on racial equality among the different groups, and the creation of a 'national culture based on enlarging the overlapping areas of cultural beliefs and practices shared by the Malay, Chinese and Indian cultures'.[55]

> The government introduced a Confucianism-based programme called "Our Shared Values", in which shared common values from all ethnic communities were moulded into a new set for the country. These would be the basis of a new common national identity.

The PAP introduced a policy of "multi-racialism", which had pillars of multi-lingualism, multiculturalism and respect for different religions. It emphasised an overarching national Singaporean identity, rather than ethic identities. The PAP government was careful not to have the Chinese community dominate, and refrained from pushing the assimilation of the different communities into the largest Chinese community. The PAP government emphasised the universal idea of "Singaporean", rather than a specific ethnic identity.

The government introduced a Confucianism-based programme called "Our Shared Values",[56] in which shared common values from all ethnic communities were moulded into a new set for the country. These would be the basis of a new common national identity. 'The values [were] intended to promote certain common beliefs and attitudes that capture the essence of being Singaporean... In this way, in time, all communities [would] gradually develop more common, distinctively Singaporean characteristics'.[57]

Five overarching shared values were identified as: nation before community and society before self; family as the basic unit of society; community support and respect for the individual; consensus not conflict; and racial and religious harmony.[58]

The PAP, dominated by Chinese, brought all ethnic groups into its party leaders and membership structures. It also opened appointments to Cabinet, government and state agencies to all ethnic groups. It introduced meritocracy into its party promotion policies and for appointments to the public service, securing of government contracts and business licenses. It introduced what is called Group Representation Constituencies, which guarantee representation of minorities in elected councils.

South Korea: Using Confucianism to tackle corruption

In South Korea, immediately after independence the Confucian principle of *guanxi* (one's "networks" or "connections") were often misused to provide opportunities, contracts and jobs exclusively on the basis of clan, family and school ties.[59]

Major-General Park Chung Hee took power in South Korea in 1961 and launched the Third Republic of Korea, which lasted from 1961 to 1971. Park himself labelled corruption as "evil", and pushed for severe punishment for those found to be corrupt and generous rewards for those found to be performing their public duties diligently, honestly and efficiently.

Park called for both economic and "spiritual" modernisation of the society, using aspects of Confucianism to tackle corruption. He argued that economic transformation could not happen unless it is preceded by a transformation of moral values. "Spiritual" modernisation was meant to be a change of moral values in the public service and broader society to emphasise honesty, hard work and efficiency. When he launched his anti-corruption drive, he initially focused on high-ranking public servants to send the message that the government was serious about combatting corruption. During his leadership, two Cabinet ministers were imprisoned for corruption.[60]

The subsequent government in March 1975 launched a nation-wide anti-corruption movement called *Suhjongshoeshin* Movement (Government's Purification Campaign). It aimed to achieve

"National Restoration", through tackling corruption, increasing public sector efficiency, and restoring moral values. In the public sector, the project introduced training and rewards for efficiency and honesty: It introduced improvements in administrative regulations, reporting practices and budget management. It focused on cleaning the environment.

The targets for remedial action within the government include unjust, uncaring or corrupt behaviour. Behaviour which undermined discipline and administrative efficiency was policed. There was monitoring of officials perceived to have extravagant private lives, which were deemed to exceed "proper" living standards of government officials. Outside employment activities, which conflicted with employees' public service jobs, were also policed.

During the year of its introduction, around 22 000 civil servants were punished. The movement was launched by dismissing 331 public officials in February 1975, among them 46 were high ranking officials, including two Deputy Ministers Ministers[61]. To tackle corrupt behaviour in broader society, attempts were made to inculcate what the government called healthy mind-sets. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), sports, professional and community organisations were required to rid themselves of corrupt practices and leaders. Members of the public who attempted to solicit favours or request illegal actions of public officials, such as buying information, were severely punished. Officials who accepted bribes were also punished and publicly shamed.

> Immediately after independence South Korea had patronage cultural systems called guanxi, whereby opportunities, contracts and jobs were given on the basis of clan, family and school ties.

South Korea established a meritocratic bureaucracy which also reduced corruption across society. Meritocratic public administration was put in place, which included examination-based recruitment to the civil service and the public service. Promotions were also based on merit.

Conclusion: Lessons for South Africa and Africa

The question is often asked whether African culture and traditions are obstacles to development and democracy.

During African colonialism and apartheid, colonial powers often chose to highlight aspects or distorted elements of African culture and traditions which would reinforce the oppression of the colonised African people. The aspects of African culture and traditions which colonial and apartheid governments highlighted were often the more autocratic, subservient or anti-developmental ones.

Many colonial and apartheid governments ruled African populations through a different set of laws, called "customary law", which were ostensibly African 'traditional' and 'cultural' laws, conventions and institutions. The African scholar Mahmood Mamdani called this phenomenon 'indirect rule' of colonial governments.[62] Colonial governments confirmed 'traditional leaders', chiefs and kings or installed their own, and set new 'traditional' rules, laws and institutions to make people subservient to both the colonial government and the colonial government-endorsed 'traditional' leaders, chiefs, kings and institutions.

In the post-independence period, most African governments and leaders retained the colonially appointed traditional chiefs, kings and structures – and their powers over their 'subjects', on condition that these former colonial appendages ensured their 'subjects' loyally support or vote for the African governments and leaders. In the post-independence period, many African leaders and governments have highlighted or emphasised only the more autocratic, subservient and anti-developmental aspects of African culture and tradition. They have done so in many cases to reinforce their own control over their populations.

Some African countries and leaders have either, for self-interested reasons, emphasised the

undemocratic elements of African culture or, for ideological reasons, rejected democracy building as "foreign". Other African leaders and governments opportunistically argue that democracy is unAfrican, "Western" or against African culture because it shields them from democracy scrutiny so that they can continue to enrich themselves at the expense of overwhelmingly poor Africans.

Many political, traditional and cultural "leaders" have increasingly been using supposedly "African" "culture" and "traditions" to excuse their personal wrongdoing: South African former President Jacob Zuma said that corruption is a "Western paradigm".[63]

> Many political, traditional and cultural "leaders" have increasingly been using supposedly "African" "culture" and "traditions" to excuse their personal wrongdoing: South African former President Jacob Zuma said that corruption is a "Western paradigm".

Thus, some African governments and leaders have invented new African "traditions" and "cultures" – claiming these to be authentic.[64] Such new "traditions" and "cultures" are put forward by self-serving leaders and governments to either cover-up misdeeds, shield criticisms or to shore their political support base – and so their ability to secure patronage – among poor, uneducated and uninformed communities.[65]

African culture and traditions have both democratic and autocratic aspects, and both developmental and anti-developmental aspects. The African countries that have dedicatedly pushed for democracy since the end of colonialism – such as Botswana and Mauritius - have been richer and more peaceful.

Botswana has, since independence, emphasised aspects of African traditional culture, such as the concept of *lekgotla*, which involves popular participation in decision-making; consensus-seeking; governing in the interest of the widest number of the population; and leadership accountability. Botswana has outshone all of those that labelled democracy as unAfrican or introduced aspects of democracy which favoured only them.

The African concept of *Ubuntu*[66] is important here. Archbishop Desmond Tutu described *Ubuntu* as: 'My humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in what is yours'[67]. Former South African President Nelson Mandela based his leadership on moral integrity. Mandela exercised "Ubuntu-style management": 'Its emphasis not on differences, but on accommodating these'[68].

Rwanda, between January and December 1994, saw one of the world's most terrifying ethnic genocides. In 2005, the Rwandan government re-established the traditional community court system called "Gacaca". In the *Gacaca* system, communities at the local level elect judges to hear the trials of genocide suspects accused of all crimes except planning of genocide. The courts give lower sentences if the person is repentant and seeks reconciliation with the community.

Since 2005, more than 12 000 community-based courts have tried 1.2 million cases throughout the country. The *Gacaca* trials provide victims with the truth. They give perpetrators the opportunity to confess their crimes, show remorse and ask for forgiveness in front of their community. The *Gacaca* courts were closed on 4 May 2012.

It is crucial for Africans to push determinedly the aspects of African culture and traditions which will enhance democracy and development. African cultural practices which undermine individual human dignity, value and rights must either be abolished immediately or reformed.

The great challenge of this generation in Africa and, indeed, South Africa is how to emphasise democratic elements in African culture and tradition and cut out the

autocratic elements; and similarly, how to elevate the developmental aspects. For this African and South African generation to fail to grasp the nettle of this challenge is to perpetuate another generation of failed African states, with poverty-stricken, broken and unstable societies.

NOTES

1   Wonsuk Chang and Leah Kalmanson (2010) (eds.) *Confucianism in Context*, New York, State University of New York Press; Tu Wei Ming (1996) *Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity. Moral Education and Economic Culture in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press

2   Sor-hoon Tan (2010). "Confucianism and democracy". In Wonsuk Chang and Leah Kalmanson (eds.) *Confucianism in Context* (pp. 103-120). New York, State University of New York Press.e

3   Craig K. Ihara (2004) "Are Individual Rights Necessary? A Confucian Perspective", In Kwong-loi Sun and David B. Wong (eds) *Confucian Ethics: A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and Community*, Cambridge University Press

4   C.-H, Yen (2008) *The Chinese in Southeast Asia and Beyond: Socio-economic and political dimensions*. World Scientific Publishing

5   D. K. Gardner (2003) Zhu Xi *Reading of the Analects: Canon, Commentary and the Classical Tradition,* Columbia University Press

6   D. K. Gardner (2003) *Zhu Xi's Reading of the Analects: Canon, Commentary and the Classical Tradition*, Columbia University Press

7   Sin-Mei Cheah and Saifullah M. Dewan (2015) "Influences of Moral Virtues and Confucianism on e-Business Enterpreneurs: An Exploratory Study in Singapore", *PACIS* 2015 Proceedings, 229. https://aisel.aisnet.org/pacis2015/229

8   Sin-Mei Cheah and Saifullah M. Dewan (2015) "Influences of Moral Virtues and Confucianism on e-Business Enterpreneurs: An Exploratory Study in Singapore", *PACIS* 2015 Proceedings, 229. https://aisel.aisnet.org/pacis2015/229

9   Sor-hoon Tan (2010). "Confucianism and democracy". In Wonsuk Chang and Leah Kalmanson (eds.) *Confucianism in Context* (pp. 103-120). New York, State University of New York Press.e

10 Chenyang Li (2012) "Equality and Inequality in Confucianism", *Dao* (11) 3, pp 295-313

11 Chenyang Li (2012) "Equality and Inequality in Confucianism", *Dao* (11) 3, pp 295-313

12 Sin-Mei Cheah and Saifullah M. Dewan(2015) "Influences of Moral Virtues and Confucianism on e-Business Enterpreneurs: An Exploratory Study in Singapore", *PACIS* 2015 Proceedings, 229

13 Chenyang Li (2006) "The Confucian Ideal of Harmony", *Philosophy East and West*, 56 (4), (Oct.), pp. 583-603

14 Chenyang Li (2006) "The Confucian Ideal of Harmony", *Philosophy East and West*, 56 (4), (Oct.), pp. 583-603

15 Chenyang Li (2006) "The Confucian Ideal of Harmony", *Philosophy East and West*, 56 (4), (Oct.), pp. 583-603

16 Chenyang Li (2006) "The Confucian Ideal of Harmony", *Philosophy East and West*, 56 (4), (Oct.), pp. 583-603

17 Charlene Tan (2012) "'Our Shared Values' in Singapore: A Confucian perspective". *Educational Theory*, 62(4), pp. 449-463

18 Torbjörn Lodén (2006) *Rediscovering Confucianism, a Major Philosophy of Life in East Asia*, Folkestone, Global Oriental Media

19 Tu Wei Ming (1996) *Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity. Moral Education and Economic Culture in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press

20 Curriculum Development Institute of Singapore (1985) *Confucian Ethics, Textbook for Secondary Three*. Singapore Educational Publications; Curriculum Development Institute of Singapore (1985) *Confucian Ethics, Textbook for Secondary Four*. Singapore Educational Publications

21 Tu Wei Ming (1996) *Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity. Moral Education and Economic Culture in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Sor-hoon Tan (2010). "Confucianism and democracy". In Wonsuk Chang and Leah Kalmanson (eds.) *Confucianism in Context* (pp. 103-120). New York, State University of New York Press; Wm. Theodore de Bary (2000) *Asian Values and Human Rights - A Confucian Communitarian Perspective*, Harvard University Press

22 Sor-hoon Tan (2010). "Confucianism and democracy". In Wonsuk Chang and Leah Kalmanson (eds.) *Confucianism in Context* (pp. 103-120). New York, State University of New York Press, p. 104

23 Kwon, Tai-Hwan and Hein, Cho (1997) "Confucianism and Korean Society: A Historical Basis of Korean Democratization", in Michèle Schmiegelow (ed.) *Democracy in Asia*, pp. 321–338. Frankfurt a.M.: Campus Verlag.

24 Sor-hoon Tan (2010). "Confucianism and democracy". In Wonsuk Chang and Leah Kalmanson (eds.) *Confucianism in Context* (pp. 103-120). New York, State University of New York Press, p. 104

25 G. K. Y. Chan (2008) "The relevance and value of Confucianism in contemporary business ethics", *Journal of Business Ethics*, 77(3), pp. 347-360

26 G. K. Y. Chan (2008) "The relevance and value of Confucianism in contemporary business ethics", *Journal of Business Ethics*, 77(3), pp. 347-360

27 *Asia Exchange* (2017) "Confucianism – Shaping Asian Cultures for over 2,000 Years", *Asia Exchange*, March 3, https://www.asiaexchange.org/blogs/confucianism-shaping-asian-cultures-for-over-2000-years/

28 Nicolas Levi (2013) "The Impact of Confucianism in South Korea and Japan", *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia*, 26, pp. 7-15

29 Wei-Ming Tu (1984*) Confucian Ethnics Today: The Singapore Challenge*, Curriculum Development Institute of Singapore and Federal Publications, pp. 105-106.

30 Francis Fukuyama (1995) "Confucianism and Democracy", *Journal of Democracy* 6, pp. 20-33; Wei-Ming Tu (1984*) Confucian Ethnics Today: The Singapore Challenge*, Curriculum Development Institute of Singapore and Federal Publications, pp. 105-106.

31 Charlene Tan (2012) "'Our Shared Values' in Singapore: A Confucian perspective". *Educational Theory*, 62(4), pp. 449-463

32 Charlene Tan (2012) "'Our Shared Values' in Singapore: A Confucian perspective". *Educational Theory*, 62(4), pp. 449-463

33 Khun-Eng Kuah (1990) "Confucian ideology and social engineering in Singapore", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 20(3), pp. 371-383
34 Wei-Ming Tu (1984*) Confucian Ethnics Today: The Singapore Challenge*, Curriculum Development Institute of Singapore and Federal Publications, pp. 105-106.
35 Wei-Ming Tu (1984*) Confucian Ethnics Today: The Singapore Challenge*, Curriculum Development Institute of Singapore and Federal Publications, pp. 105-106.
36 *Asia Exchange* (2017) "Confucianism – Shaping Asian Cultures for over 2,000 Years", *Asia Exchange*, March 3, https://www.asiaexchange.org/blogs/confucianism-shaping-asian-cultures-for-over-2000-years/
37 Francis Fukuyama (1995) "Confucianism and Democracy", *Journal of Democracy* 6, pp. 20-33
38 Justin Moyer (2015) "How Lee Kuan Yew made Singapore strong: Family values", *Washington Post*, March 23 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/03/23/how-lee-kuan-yew-made-singapore-strong-family-values/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9fe02b8d3665
39 Ming-sho Ho and Jeffrey Broadbent (2011) "Introduction to Taiwanese Society, Culture, and Politics". In Jeffrey Broadbent and Vicky Brockman, (Eds.) *East Asian Social Movements: Power, Protest and Change in a Dynamic Region*. Springer, pp. 231-235; Christian Goebel (2016) "Taiwan's Fight Against Corruption", *Journal of Democracy*, 27 (1), January, pp. 124-138 ; Yu-Shan Wu (2007) "Taiwan's Developmental State: After the Economic and Political Turmoil", *Asian Survey*, 47 (6), November/December 2007), pp. 977-1001, p.981
40 Singapore (1991) "White Paper on Shared Values", Singapore National Printers, p.1
41 Charlene Tan (2012) "'Our Shared Values' in Singapore: A Confucian perspective". *Educational Theory*, 62(4), pp. 449-463
42 Amartya Sen (1999) *Development as Freedom*, Introduction, Oxford University Press
43 The Institute of East Asian Philosophies (1988) "A Forum of the Role of Culture in Industrial Asia – The Relationship between Confucian Ethics and Modernisation", Public Lecture Series No. 7, The Institute of East Asian Philosophies, Singapore, p.13
44 David B. Wong (2004) "Rights and Community in Confucianism", In Kwong-loi Shun and David B. Wong (eds) *Confucian Ethics: A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and Community*. Cambridge University Press, p.35
45 Asian Development Bank (2012) "The *Saemaul Undong* movement in the Republic of Korea: Sharing knowledge on community-driven development", Mandaluyong City, Philippines, Asian Development Bank
46 Asian Development Bank (2012) "The *Saemaul Undong* movement in the Republic of Korea: Sharing knowledge on community-driven development", Mandaluyong City, Philippines, Asian Development Bank
47 Asian Development Bank (2012) "The *Saemaul Undong* movement in the Republic of Korea: Sharing knowledge on community-driven development", Mandaluyong City, Philippines, Asian Development Bank
48 Asian Development Bank (2012) "The *Saemaul Undong* movement in the Republic of Korea: Sharing knowledge on community-driven development", Mandaluyong City, Philippines, Asian Development Bank
49 Peter F. Drucker (1971) "What we can learn from Japanese management", *Harvard Business Review*, March https://hbr.org/1971/03/what-we-can-learn-from-japanese-management
50 William S. Rutchow (1987) "Japanese-Style Worker Participation and United States Labor Law", *Michigan Journal of International Law*, 8(1) 211-230. Available at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol8/iss1/8
51 Takao Kato (2016) "Productivity, wages and unions in Japan", Conditions of Work and Employment Series, 73, International Labour Organisation, Geneva
52 Takao Kato (2016) "Productivity, wages and unions in Japan", Conditions of Work and Employment Series, 73, International Labour Organisation, Geneva
53 Singapore Government (1991) "Shared Values: White Paper on Shared Values", Singapore National Printers, p.6
54 Daniel P.S. Goh (2017) "Diversity and Nation-Building in Singapore", Accounting for Change Publication Series, Global Centre for Pluralism, National University of Singapore, p.3
55 Daniel P.S. Goh (2017) "Diversity and Nation-Building in Singapore", Accounting for Change Publication Series, Global Centre for Pluralism, National University of Singapore, p.5
56 Singapore Government (1991) "Shared Values: White Paper on Shared Values", Singapore National Printers
57 Singapore Government (1991) "Shared Values: White Paper on Shared Values", Singapore National Printers, p.6
58 Singapore Government (1991) "Shared Values: White Paper on Shared Values", Singapore National Printers, p.3
59 Jonathan Moran (1998) "Corruption and NIC Development: A case of South Korea", Crime, *Law and Social Change* 29, pp. 161-177
60 Kim, S-H. (2008). *The Assessment of Bureaucratic Corruption Control in South Korea: The Importance of Political Will in Government's Anti-Corruption Efforts*. A PhD Thesis submitted to the Department of Politics, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Sheffield, U.K. in April 2008, accessed 26 June 2018, (http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/ 14515/1/489380.pdf)
61 Kim, S-H. (2008). *The Assessment of Bureaucratic Corruption Control in South Korea: The Importance of Political Will in Government's Anti-Corruption Efforts*. A PhD Thesis submitted to the Department of Politics, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Sheffield, April 2008
62 Mahmood Mamdani (1996) *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*, Princeton University Press
63 Charl du Plessis and Carien du Plessis (2014) "Zuma wanted charges dropped because corruption is a 'Western thing'. City Press, October 12 (https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Zuma-wanted-charges-dropped-because-corruption-is-a-Western-thing-20141012)
64 William Gumede (2012) *Restless Nation: Making Sense of Troubled Times*, Tafelberg
65 William Gumede (2012) *Restless Nation: Making Sense of Troubled Times*, Tafelberg
66 Ubuntu means behaving in benevolent ways towards others, to care for others and build one's community. Christian B.N. Gade (2012) "What is Ubuntu? Different Interpretations among South Africans of African Descent", *South African Journal of Philosophy* 31 (3) (August 2012), p. 487
67 Desmond Tutu (2000) *No Future Without Forgiveness: A Personal Overview of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, Rider
68 Desmond Tutu (2000) *No Future Without Forgiveness: A Personal Overview of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, Rider